THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE KEMALIST TUTELARY REGIME IN TURKEY (2007–2017): AN INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION

Abstract

The article examines the transformation of the Kemalist tutelary regime in Turkey between 2007 and 2017 through the lens of institutional changes that redefined the configuration of the Turkish republican order. The primary focus is on analyzing how the constitutional reforms and referendums of 2007, 2010, and 2017 affected the redistribution of powers, the status of key state institutions, and the changing patterns of interaction among political authority, the judiciary, the military, and the bureaucracy. It is shown that the Kemalist tutelary regime long served as a distinctive mechanism for constraining the political process, within which the military, the higher judiciary, and the state apparatus positioned themselves as guarantors of secularism, unitarism, and the foundational principles of the republic.
The article argues that the dismantling of this regime was not reducible to democratization or the removal of military influence from politics. Rather, it constituted a complex and contradictory process of institutional restructuring, in which the weakening of the traditional centers of Kemalist tutelage was accompanied by the gradual strengthening of executive power. It is established that the 2007 referendum marked a significant shift in the model of presidential legitimation by introducing the direct popular election of the president. The 2010 referendum is shown to have undermined the old tutelary system — primarily through changes in the judiciary and civil-military relations — while simultaneously opening new avenues for political control over judicial institutions. The 2017 referendum is demonstrated to have completed this cycle of transformations by consolidating the transition to a presidential system of government and substantially altering the balance among the branches of power.
The article emphasizes that the transformation of the Kemalist tutelary regime had a dual character: on the one hand, it meant the weakening of military-bureaucratic patronage over politics, while on the other hand, it contributed to the formation of a new model of centralized power. It is concluded that the institutional changes of 2007–2017 not only dismantled the old tutelary system but also laid the groundwork for a new form of political domination in which democratic legitimacy is not necessarily accompanied by the preservation of effective constitutional checks and balances.