ALTRUISM AS A FACTOR OF MORALITY

Abstract

The status of altruism in moral theory is reconsidered through conceptual analysis and synthesis of elements of moral theory based on model thought experiments. The starting point here is the understanding that altruism cannot be non-selective in conditions of competition and limited viability. Morality, as a certain way of regulating behavior, is not a way of maximizing altruism, and altruism is not a criterion for the «morality» of an act. On the contrary, morality sets (within its scope) a norm of permissible «altruism,» and this norm is characteristic of a particular moral code. The author presents a descriptive definition of morality as a complex of processes of regulation of relations at four levels of manifestation. Altruistic behavior is specified as a quasi-parental model of relationships that are transferred in the community not only to direct descendants. This model, as part of the mechanism of moral regulation, determines inverse altruism on the part of descendants towards elders, which becomes a criterion for the eugenic selection of individuals who, by gaining the appropriate social status (moral reputation), secure privileges, but at the same time, it maintains and reproduces the social structure of effective cooperation. Morality as a mechanism of eugenic selection and regulation of interpersonal relations in a social group forms an altruistic attitude towards the actual cultivated examples of a worthy person, a willingness to sacrifice oneself for the sake of moral reputation. Such a mechanism ensures the reproduction of individuals with certain human qualities, including the motivational attitude to put one’s reputation in the group at the forefront of the hierarchy of values and at the same time the willingness to support one’s own first, the need to share with them, the need to give something to those whose qualities you admire and are a role model.