PHILIP KITCHER’S PRAGMATIC NATURALISM: REVOLUTION IN ETHICS LEFT UNDONE

Abstract

The paper examines the methodological tenets and inherent contradictions of Philip Kitcher’s pragmatic naturalism, as delineated in his work The Ethical Project (2011). The author posits that while Kitcher charts a genuinely revolutionary methodological turn — shifting the focus from the justification of norms to the description of the mechanisms underlying their genesis and evolution — he falls short of fully realizing it owing to an unmitigated tension between descriptive theory and normative sermonizing. Consequently, this study proposes to expand Kitcher’s project by introducing three conceptual augmentations: a theory of morality conceived as a mechanism of social control centered on virtue and reputation; the criterion of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) serving as an immanent, objective meta-criterion; and a rigorous demarcation between the descriptive theory of morality and the epistemology of normative decision-making.