THE INFLUENCE OF ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY ON THE EARLY FORMATION OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL: A CONTEMPORARY VIEW

Abstract

Recent discussions in modern philosophy suggest a new way of interpreting the early Frankfurt School — especially the works of T. Adorno and M. Horkheimer. The idea is that their approach shows signs of a «linguistic turn», similar in structure and intention to the later work of L. Wittgenstein. Specifically, elements of their thinking reflect core features of the philosophy of ordinary language — particularly its therapeutic, analytical, and antimetaphysical tendencies.
That said, this view needs to be refined. It overlooks the significant tension between the Frankfurt School and the broader tradition of analytic philosophy of language. A clear example of this tension is found in H. Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man (1964), where he strongly criticizes analytic approaches — especially those associated with L. Wittgenstein, G. Ryle, and J. L. Austin — for focusing too narrowly on ordinary language. Marcuse saw this focus as a sign of conformity to the dominant values of modern capitalist society.
However, Marcuse also showed interest in another type of linguistic philosophy, one he associated with the writer and satirist K. Kraus. From this angle, Marcuse’s critique is not a rejection of linguistic analysis as a whole, but of specific forms and how they operate socially.
This opens the door to rethinking the Frankfurt School’s early methodology as a kind of «active» or «non-quietist» philosophical therapy. Rather than simply solving philosophical problems by identifying language confusion — as some readings of Wittgenstein suggest — this approach seeks to challenge and reshape language use as part of broader social critique. In this way, ordinary language analysis becomes a tool for cultural criticism with clear ethical and political implications.