ON THE MEANING OF THE TERM “GOODNESS” AND THE NOTABLE FALLACY OF J. Е. MOORE

Abstract

There are counterarguments both to the objections of J. E. Moore’s argument “open question”: and to the statement of the question itself with the argument that it is impossible to reduce the essence of good (goodness) to objective characteristics (physical or metaphysical). It is shown that the meaning of the term “good” is not a concept, but a sign in a linguistic act, which indicates the relationship to a particular object in view of the accepted evaluation criterion, ie “good” means the actual evaluation (value of evaluation judgment). So it is pointless to look for an absolute measure of goodness by referring to any objective characteristics (as Moore argues), but there is also no “goodness” of goodness. The content of the evaluation criterion, on which the speaker relies, expressing his attitude to something as good is completely arbitrary and always relative. However, the adoption of a certain criterion is not neutral in terms of its consequences for those who accept such a criterion, because if such a criterion motivates actions that reduce the viability of the community that cultivates it, then the death of this community leads to the elimination of such criteria. Thus, communities are selected for mental attitudes, tested for compatibility with living conditions and competition in them for vital resources with other communities, for resistance to factors that destroy the mechanism of reproduction of the organized whole.
The presented considerations open the way for a reliable naturalistic substantiation of moral norms in the paradigm of evolutionary ethics.