THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE: A GAME-THEORETIC MODEL


DOI: https://doi.org/10.17721/2415-881x.2025.97.75-95

Vadym Derkach

Abstract


The article presents a game-theoretic model of justice that interprets it not as a moral axiom but as an emergent mechanism for stabilizing cooperation. It introduces a threshold-contribution game with asymmetric proposer risk and probabilistic bonus activation, within which players adaptively form coalitions of reciprocity. The analysis shows that a moderately asymmetric allocation rule — grounded in role reciprocity and participation guarantees — emerges as a stable criterion of justice. The model explains the genesis of justice as an instrumental virtue that enhances the long-term viability of communities and preserves its significance even in situations involving the distribution of losses.

Keywords


justice; game theory; cooperative models; evolutionarily stable strategy (ess); social stability; critical scarcity and loss allocation

References


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