THE SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES OF UKRAINE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 2004 CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM


DOI: https://doi.org/10.17721/2415-881x.2025.94.141-151

Alina Voichuk

Abstract


The article analyzes the system of checks and balances in Ukraine, which is an essential component of the separation of state powers. This system prevents the usurpation of power and ensures equilibrium among the branches of government. It has been established that the constitutional reform of 2004 significantly altered the distribution of powers in Ukraine, impacting the interaction between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. As a result of these changes, Ukraine became a parliamentary-presidential republic, whereby the powers of the Verkhovna Rada in forming the government were expanded. The article examines the powers of the President of Ukraine within the parliamentary-presidential model. It is demonstrated that the President lost the unilateral ability to appoint the Prime Minister, making the government more dependent on the parliamentary coalition. Nonetheless, the President retained certain levers of influence, including the right to veto legislation, the ability to dissolve Parliament under constitutionally defined conditions, and authority in foreign policy and national defense. It is shown that the Verkhovna Rada, in turn, gained more tools to oversee the executive branch, including approval of the Cabinet of Ministers’ composition, endorsement of the government’s program of action, and the ability to express a vote of no confidence. The judiciary was intended to play the role of arbiter in disputes among the branches of power; however, its independence remained constrained due to political influence. The study concludes that the 2004 reform was repealed in 2010 but reinstated in 2014, and its core principles continue to shape the modern system of checks and balances in Ukraine. The article highlights the critical role of judicial review in this mechanism, particularly in assessing the constitutionality of acts passed by the legislative and executive branches, thereby upholding the rule of law. Furthermore, decentralization, as part of subsequent reforms, has strengthened this balance by expanding the powers of local self-government bodies.

Keywords


checks and balances system; separation of powers; President of Ukraine; Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine

References


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