THE ECONOMIC KEYNOTE OF THE MODERN WAVE OF SEPARATISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Abstract

Separatism has long been present in Western Europe as a political and social phenomenon. In the 21st century, it is the most manifest in the most affluent and successful countries in the European Union, including the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Germany, and Belgium. The paradox of this phenomenon is that the political aspect of the issue, which represents the confrontation between the newly emerged elite of «disobedient territories» and the central authorities, is closely intertwined with the economic factor of regional inequality, which has historically been present in those countries.

The objective of the article is, therefore, to elucidate the economic factor in the separatist sentiments in the countries of Old Europe and the role of regional political elites in the formation of separatist sentiments.

The methodology used in the course of research includes a number of scientific methods. The historical method helped reveal the features of separatist sentiments in specific EU countries and the internal and external factors that have transformed these sentiments into a commonplace public stance. The comparative method allowed clarifying the peculiarities of separatist movements in particular countries and the intentions of the political discourse in the political and legal field which they produce in order to support the view that secession is more beneficial to all than remaining within the ineffective state system. Finally, the dialectical method made it possible to identify political contradictions between governments and regions within their common history with delicate and contestable moments that secessionists seek to use in their struggle for independence.

The manifestation of separatism and secessionist policies by opposition forces has been analysed in Spain, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

It is noted that in the United Kingdom, where the rich province of Britain seeks to keep its political influence over the poorer provinces, separatist sentiments in Catalonia (Spain), Bavaria (Germany), South Tyrol (Italy), in Flanders and Wallonia (Belgium) are more akin to whims of human rationality, seeking for even more material possessions for already economically successful provinces with broad autonomy.

Based upon the analysis conducted, the following findings have been arrived at. First, European separatism is not a one-dimensional phenomenon and includes economic as well as political, ethnic and national motives. Second, European separatism varies from country to country: in the UK, it is categorical for long-term purposes and historically caused by the negative effects of colonization policies by the British in other provinces; in Spain, it is nationally and culturally specific, based on identity and history; and in Germany, it is «soft» in form and restrained in manifestation, with autonomy and federalization not destroying the state.

Key words: separatism; secession; Balkanization of Europe; state of autonomies; economic man
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ЕКОНОМІЧНА ДОМІНАНТА СУЧАСНОЇ ХВИЛІ СЕПАРАТИЗМУ
В КРАЇНАХ ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОГО СОЮЗУ

Резюме
Констатується, що як політичне і соціальне явище сепаратизм в країнах Західної Європи присутній давно. У XXI столітті найбільш відчутно він заявив про себе в успішних країнах Європейського Союзу. Йдеться про такі країни як Велика Британія, Іспанія, Італія, Німеччина та Бельгія. Парадокс цього феномену полягає у тому, що політичний аспект питання, який уособлює протистояння новоявленої еліти «неслухняних територій» з центральною владою, тісно переплетений з економічним чинником регіональної нерівності, яка у цих країнах присутня історично.
Метою статті є уточнення економічного чинника у сепаратистських настроях в країнах старої Європи та ролі регіональної політичної еліти у формуванні сепаратистських настроїв у масовій свідомості.
У процесі підготовки статті були використані наступні наукові методи: історичний — для розкриття особливостей сепаратистських настроїв в окремих країнах ЄС та внутрішніх і зовнішніх чинників, які ці настрої перетворили у сталу думку великої кількості людей; компаративний — для уточнення крайнозначних особливостей діяльності сепаратистських рухів та інтенції політичного дискурсу у політико-правовому полі, який вони продукують з метою підтримки думки, що сецесія — це більше благо для всіх, ніж залишатися у полі неефективної державної влади; діалектичний — для виявлення політичних суперечностей між центральною владою і регіонами у межах спільної історії, яка має складні і суперечливі сторінки, які прихильники сецесії прагнуть використати у своїй боротьбі за незалежність.
Розкриті особливості прояву сепаратизму й політики сецесії з боку опозиційних сил в таких країнах як Іспанія, Німеччина та Велика Британія. Зроблено висновок, що на відмінну від Великої Британії, де багата провінція Британії прагне утримати у полі свого політичного впливу більш бідніші провінції, сепаратистські настрої у Каталонії (Іспанія), у Баварії (Німеччина),
у Південному Тіролі (Італія), у Фландрії і Валлонії (Бельгія) виглядають як примхи людської раціональності, яка прагне все більшої кількості матеріальних благ і без того економічно успішних провінцій, які мають широку автономію.

Висновки. По-перше, європейський сепаратизм не є одномірним явищем. В ньому присутні як політичні й етнонаціональні, так і економічні мотиви. По-друге, європейський сепаратизм має свої регіональні особливості: у Великій Британії він категоричний у довгострокових цілях і історично обумовлений негативними наслідками політики колонізації британцями інших провінцій. В Іспанії він має національно-культурну специфіку, яка базується на ідентичності й історії. У Німеччині він м'який за формою і стрімний за способом позиціонування у внутрішній політиці, коли автономізація і федералізація не руйнують цілісність держави.

Ключові слова: сепаратизм; сецесія; балканізація Європи; держава автономій; економічна людина

Introduction

As a political and social phenomenon, separatism has long been present in Western Europe. In the 21st century, it was the most manifest in the most affluent and successful European Union member states, including the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Germany and Belgium. The paradox of this phenomenon is that the political aspect of the issue, which represents the confrontation between the newly emerged elite of «disobedient territories» and the central authorities, is closely intertwined with the economic factor of regional inequality, which has historically been present in those countries.

From the standpoint of political viability of the state as a system that accumulates internal and external resources to maintain itself and function for the common good of all citizens, modern European separatism is a counterproductive side effect of human rationality that lays bare the selfishness of large cultural and ethnic groups and elites supported by them, which seek secession from states.

A number of factors have contributed to the politicization of growing economic problems and, accordingly, a surge in regional separatist sentiments in the countries in question. First and foremost, it is the financial and economic crisis of 2008, which significantly affected the performance of national economies, the socio-economic status of particular territories, and the wellbeing of citizens. Secondly, it is a wave of untrammelled migration from North Africa and the Middle East resulting from the Arab Spring and the Syrian war, which led to a wave of confrontation between the local population and immigrants. Thirdly, it is the sanctions confrontation between the United States and Russia, and Russia and the EU, brought about by the countermeasures of the united West against Moscow as the violator of international law and the aggressor State, which affected their trading operations. Ultimately, the synthesis of these factors was most acutely felt by, first, young people, up to half of whom are unemployed, as is the case in Spain and France; second, people associated with large industrial production (since the result is job cuts); and, third, the socially challenged population, i. e. pensioners, people in need of social care, etc.

With due regard being paid to those factors of separatism, one should also keep in mind the psychology of the economic man, or Homo Economicus, as a phenomenon of Western culture in general and the culture of consumption in particular. The economic man, who makes up the largest group of population, has also experienced a substantial plunge in living standards. The social status of the «middle class» and the economic man’s belief in progress through unlimited economic consumption and accumulation of wealth pushes them towards increasing social activism and solidarity with poorer population in terms of protecting their rights. This social setup entrenches in the minds of the people the points of classical political economy stating that the nature of social relations is determined by power relations and the amount of profit received. On the one hand, this affects the redistribution of the added value of the final product, which remains largely in the hands of the wealthy population; and on the other hand, the concept of an «information society» economy dissolves not only any opposition
in society but also opposition movements. In this regard, the researcher David Lyon posits that major contradictions in society are even less prone to manifestations than inequality and conflicts. In the context of information technology, he says, today’s opposition movements define themselves in terms of lack of information about the relation between the common good and cheap services. This line of state information policy only foments the secessionist sentiments of the political opposition in «particularly difficult» regions, seeking to mobilise the middle class in pursuit of an independent state.

The varying nature of separatism in EU member states has been studied by J. Humphrey, T. Wang, K. Severin, J. Bill, J. Cocklay, J. Mark-Harri, etc., and by such researchers from the post-Soviet countries as O. Slobotchikov, V. Kiselev, A. Avramenko, I. Luppov, etc. While recognising the contributions of those authors in addressing the problem of separatism in the EU, two circumstances need to be pointed out. First, there is insufficient analysis of the risks to European unity of a new factor called Brexit, which seeks to release one state from the custody of EU bureaucracy and bring back its national sovereignty. And, second, the growing economic problems in the EU run the risk of undermining the unity of autonomous states, which is falling prey to political forces that strive for secession and the creation of new national entities.

Therefore, the purpose of this article is to elucidate the economic factor in the separatist sentiments in the countries of Old Europe and the role of regional political elites in the formation of separatist sentiments.

Research methods

In the course of the research, a number of scientific methods were used. The historical method helped reveal the features of separatist sentiments in specific EU countries and the internal and external factors that have transformed these sentiments into a commonplace public stance. The comparative method allowed clarifying the peculiarities of separatist movements in particular countries and the intentions of the political discourse in the political and legal field which they produce in order to support the view that secession is more beneficial to all than remaining within the ineffective state system. Finally, the dialectical method made it possible to identify political contradictions between governments and regions within their common history with delicate and contestable moments that secessionists seek to use in their struggle for independence.

Results and discussion

Today’s engine of European separatism and regional secessionism within the borders of the countries in question is the economic interests of certain ethnic and cultural communities that, as a rule, have long enjoyed broad autonomy. The promotion of such ideas among the general public is made possible through the democratic mechanism of political struggle and competition of ideas for the establishment of real, and not illusionary, social justice. This path to the acquisition of statehood by «disobedient territories» in Europe has already begun, the starting point being the extension of regional autonomy and a step-by-step increase in political and economic rights of the regions. Regional elites match this way of secessionism against ethnic separatism (Northern Ireland, Corsica, the Basque Country), which is conflict-prone. Radicals are being replaced by left-centre and centre-right forces, which rely on public sentiment and seek to translate them into reality. In the rhetoric of recognized representatives of the national elite and politicians in office, this is becoming the mainstream strategy of political struggle and the European way of the establishment of new states.

The Spanish province of Catalonia is the most characteristic phenomenon of modern European and national regionalism, which has every chance to obtain its statehood in the near future, this breaking the vicious circle of international law—namely «the right of peoples to self-determination and the right of the state to sovereignty and territorial integrity». On 1 October 2017, a referendum was held in Catalonia, with 90 percent of its participants (and the turnout of 42.3 percent) voting in favour of the region’s independence. The referendum was initiated by the Catalan National Assembly
(Assemblea Nacional Catalana, ANC), which considers itself to be the alternative parliament of Catalonia and the sole representative of the will of most Catalans. The political ambitions of Catalans were hindered by neither their wide autonomy within Spain nor the presence of their regional brand abroad through national diplomatic missions [1; 2]. In order to preserve the integrity of the country, the Spanish government, as well as the European Commission, understandably declared the referendum unlawful.

Experts argue that Catalan separatism is rooted in not ethnic but regional national and cultural specificities, based on the economic component. Today, the Catalan identity is embodied in language, the place of residence, and the love of homeland. It is not inherited on a national basis, but is constructed in the system of social relations of a large community that pursues a common goal. Today, it is economic independence from Madrid.

Catalonia is the richest and most economically developed province of Spain. According to official data, its economy makes up almost 20 percent of the country’s GDP. It also accounts for 25.5 percent of Spain’s industrial output, 25.6 percent of its exports, and 28.6 percent of its imports. Catalonia is the largest contributor to Spain’s budget. However, it receives 16bn euro less in state subsidies than it turns in in taxes to the state. This allowed the proponents of secession to shape a strong public opinion of the Catalans maintaining the poorer regions of Spain and Catalonia being a pillar of the economic well-being of the whole country. On the other hand, separatist sentiments in Catalonia were instigated by Madrid itself. In 2010, following a decision by the Constitutional Court of Spain, the Spanish authorities challenged a 2006 treaty with the Government of Catalonia, which gave the province broad powers in the economic and administrative areas.

The separatist rhetoric of Catalan politicians was further reinforced by the new European regional policy, adopted in 1995, which enabled particular national territories within the EU to forge closer economic ties and earn substantial income from such cooperation, further boosting Catalonia’s coffers. Within this concept, European identity politics and regionalism were rendered true in the Four Motors for Europe project, which included Catalonia (Spain), Baden-Württemberg (Germany), Lombardy (Italy) and the Rhône-Alpes (France).

Since 2018, the Parliament of Catalonia, dominated by pro-secessionist sentiments—the liberal Junts per Catalunya («Together for Catalonia»), the Republican Left of Catalonia, and the far-left Popular Unity Candidacy party—set in motion a new plan to bring independence to Catalonia. They began by returning to power Carles Puigdemont, who had ruled the province until November 2017 and was dismissed by the Spanish authorities for separatism.

Against the backdrop of the events in Catalonia, the Balkanization of Spain is further precipitated by other political parties such as the Basque Nationalist Party, Anova–Nationalist Brotherhood in Galicia, the Valencian Nationalist Bloc, the Aragonese Land and the Aragonese Party, and the Andalusian Party [1].

Similarities to Catalonia’s separatist tendencies can be found in the relations between London, on the one hand, and Ulster (Northern Ireland) and Edinburgh (Scotland), on the other; between Bonn and Bavaria; between Rome and South Tyrol; between Brussels and Flanders and Wallonia. With the exception of the UK, those territories are also the most prosperous, with broad autonomy and sporadic secessionist proclivities.

Unlike Catalonia in Spain, the German state of Bavaria takes a «softer» stand on the issue of secession from Germany. While opposing the German authorities, the Bavarians seek not secession but rather wider powers at the local level and broader representation of their views on the national agenda via including local politicians in the federal government bodies. This stand combines the German understanding of the unity of the nation—as per the Humboldtian concept of service to the country by every German—with an awareness of everyone’s individual contribution to the country’s economy. In terms of GDP, Bavaria outperforms 19 EU countries, giving way only to North Rhine-Westphalia within the German borders. Bavarian industry is famous worldwide, housing such global
brands as BMW, Siemens, Audi, Krauss-Maffei AG, etc. It makes 220bn euros of products every year. Accordingly, Bavaria is understandably attractive in terms of living standards among German states.

Since 2008, however, the Bavarians have been concerned about a number of problems that substantially affect their well-being. Opinion polls have revealed that the issue that has most concerned the Bavarians—and the Germans as a whole—is untrammelled emigration, the subsequent spike in violence in German society, and an increase in social welfare payments for emigrants from Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa—which ostensibly robs the Germans of their money. BBC Capital notes in this regard that the number of people in the country who consider this issue to be key in the country’s public policy has risen to 70 percent since the summer of 2018, sending a stern signal for the German authorities.

Consequently, in the October 2018 Bavarian state election, the Christian Social Union (CSU) party, which forms the ruling coalition with Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU), took only 37 percent of the votes, a 10-percent slide from 2013. As a result, they lost an absolute majority in the federal parliament of Bavaria, the Landtag, with Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Free Voters ushering into power with 10 percent and 11.5 percent of the votes, respectively.

Today, Alternative for Germany (AfD) is considered among the German political elites to be a far-right political party and a bellwether of the sentiments of young and senior German voters—those most susceptible to new challenges being faced by Germany. Accordingly, AfD’s political rhetoric is shaped by the topics of «emigration», «crime» and «deteriorating living standards» of the commonplace German. The leaders of AfD and Free Voters parties say that the authorities should spend more time on improving the health care system, investing in education, and ensuring that youth are provided for old age—instead of coping with emigrants.

The overall European picture of the conflict between the rich and poor regions as a source of separatism is contrasted by the recent history of the United Kingdom. Here, quite the opposite is taking place, with the richer province trying to keep the poorer ones—namely Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales—within its orbit. The irony is that the said provinces seek more economic and political freedom from London, with a view to becoming independent states within a united Europe, i.e. the European Union—at a time when the UK itself is trying to break away from the cumbersome and red-tape-plagued EU.

Irish separatism is rooted in the military and political sphere, given the 1921 war between Ireland and Great Britain and the breaking away of the northern part of Ireland as a result, as well as the economic one. Another point is the history of «coexistence» of Britain and Northern Ireland. Ironic though it may be, but it is Karl Marx who broke the ground in studying the problem in question. In his work, Capital, Marx described the very process of the advent of separatism in the «disobedient» province. The key to understanding Irish separatism was London’s overtly colonial policy towards this territory over the past 400 years. In hindsight, the tragic history of Great Britain was reflected in the unlearnt lessons of the 19th century, which carried over into the 20th and, later on, into the 21st century. In a passage on the economy of Ireland, Marx describes the nature of Ireland’s capitalising agricultural sector in the 1840s—1860s. Over just less than 25 years, the famine of 1846, which took one million lives, and the mass emigration to the United States, brought the Irish population down to 5.5mln people from 8.2mln. Today British politicians name this the genocide of the Irish people, and London its mastermind. On the other hand, the evolution in Irish agriculture, based on forcing the indigenous population out of the land, coupled with increasing hardships for workers, falling wages and a growing number of vagabonds. Drawing upon official statistics, Marx paints a gloomy picture of the critical condition of Irish farmers and villagers. «In fact the misery of Ireland is again the topic of the day in England», Marx notes [3, p. 490]. Marx calls this period in the history of Northern Ireland the «blood-letting» to the Irish people. Modern Irish are sure to remember that, and their response has been the confrontation between Ulster and London, with its manifestations in political separatism and its extreme form, Irish terrorism.
Alas, Marx’s economic insights into the problems of Ireland are no less salient for Northern Ireland today. This province of the United Kingdom is the poorest, with its economy focused on agriculture and raw material processing.

The current level of separatism in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales is closely associated with the politics of Brexit, set in motion three years ago by London following the national referendum. In the framework of the EU, Brexit as the British version of political and economic separatism proved to be a moot point not only among the politicians, which led to Boris Johnson succeeding Theresa May as Prime Minister in July 2019. Furthermore, it also strained the relations between the UK authorities and the provinces in an unexpected turn of events. For example, the politicians were rather displeased at learning that the protest sentiments of young people in the years 2017—2019, represented by two main religious denominations of Ulster, were fanned by the desire to remain in the European single economic area, the latter being the only condition for youth’s self-affirmation and self-realization within a market society. The fear of losing the EU’s standard of living compels young people to go out and choose other politicians and different politics. These sentiments set the crucial bar for both Catholic and Protestant (i.e., Unionist) youth. In fact, this means even more: Young people want to stay in Ireland, an EU member, which is impossible without addressing the status of Northern Ireland.

The topic of Brexit, on the other hand, has destroyed the precarious peace between the Democratic Unionist Party and the Sinn Fein Party in the Northern Ireland Assembly, which has never assembled since January 2017. As a result, London is seeking to tear Ulster away from the EU through customs checks on the border with Ireland, something that the EU cannot countenance since it wishes to keep Northern Ireland within the EU economic area because of its border with Ireland. Of course, London’s position is deemed unacceptable to Sinn Fein’s leadership. And the point here is not so much the political ambitions of Michelle O’Neill, the party’s leader, but the economic weakness of Ulster, which is already integrated into the EU’s economic system and is significantly subsidised by it. This also sends a worrying signal to Dublin, which, in addition to the outbreak of violence in the neighbouring territories and disorder on its border with Northern Ireland, does not expect anything good to happen.

The EU leadership has seen three manifest dangers in the consequences of Brexit for London. The first is the rising tide of violence and terror in Northern Ireland. The second is the revival of separatism in other parts of the United Kingdom. And the third is the enormous financial and economic losses incurred—an estimated 40 to 60bn euros—by the United Kingdom as a consequence of breaking financial and economic ties.

As per the first issue, London has been reminded of terrorism by a new paramilitary force, the so-called New IRA (NIRA). This organisation adheres to the ideology of Irish republicanism and advocates the union of Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland. Among Irish Republicans, the New IRA is considered to be a dissident offshoot. This political peculiarity of the organization was reflected by its activities. In February 2017 and January 2019, NIRA militants claimed responsibility for bombings in London. In a letter to the local publication Derry Journal, they claimed to continue attacking UK officials and those cooperating with them. In March 2019, Scotland Yard reported that NIRA had sent out explosive devices to Heathrow and London Airports, London Waterloo, and Glasgow University. In April 2019, NIRA representatives claimed responsibility for the assassination of an editor of the US publication Mediagazer in Londonderry, caught in the crosshairs between Protestants and the police during a nationalist rally commemorating the 1916 uprising in Dublin. Although NIRA does not explicitly link the start of its terrorist activity with Brexit, its very existence in British politics has laid the groundwork for its revival.

Likewise, the second issue mentioned above relates to the history of the United Kingdom and, again, its territorial integrity amidst Brexit. The governments of Scotland and Wales, which enjoy devolved status within the UK, have been dissatisfied with the union with England for a long time and have long been «ill with independence. » The ensuing tension was partly diffused by the 1997 referendum, with Scotland extending its autonomy and Wales obtaining limited powers (the National
Assembly, the Welsh parliament, was established in 1999). The crisis of dialogue in the 1980s was mostly precipitated by the economic policy of Margaret Thatcher, who during her tenure effectively destroyed the national coal and metal industry, which formed the basis of those regions’ economies. For ordinary citizens, the «unprofitability» of those sectors, which was politicians’ key argument, turned into unemployment and seething social discontent that further discredited the government in London.

As things stand today, Brexit has only reminded the vast majority of the population of the worst consequences of «Thatcherism» and proved to be the most dangerous political and social fuel, fanning the flames of aspiration for secession. In the September 2014 referendum, 55.3 percent of people in Scotland voted against the region’s independence. To some extent, it has had to do with the position of the United States on Scottish independence, recurrently voiced out by President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. For example, on the eve of the 2014 referendum, Clinton said in an interview to BBC Newsnight that she hoped that Scotland would not become independent.

That the idea of Scottish independence is not a fashionable political motto but a deliberate decision was reminded by Nicola Sturgeon, the leader of the Scottish National Party, in 2018. She said that the Scottish Parliament should have the right to hold another referendum … if there is a significant and material change in the circumstances that prevailed in 2014, such as Scotland being taken out of the EU against our will. According to the Scottish National Party—and contrary to official statistics—more than half of the Scottish people are ready to support this decision. London argues that most people in the region fear the deteriorating standards of living and the breaking of ties among the parts of the United Kingdom. Scottish nationalists offer a different take on the same arguments, claiming that Scotland’s economic opportunities within the European Union are much wider than Britain’s.

Two factors—namely economic figures and oil—are also at play in London’s dispute with Scotland. Official data reveals that the economy of Scotland is growing by 1 percent yearly, which is faster than the UK as a whole (0.8 percent). This allowed Scotland to revive its economy soon after the 2008–2009 crisis and claim that «the positive data reinforces confidence in the separation from the United Kingdom, and the only thing left to Edinburgh to keep progress in the economy is to vote in the referendum for separation». The «oil crisis» has set in in London-Edinburgh relations as well. In the case of emergency, the oil produced in the North Sea can stabilise Scotland’s economy and underpin its national currency. (Scotland can claim 96 percent of the oil and gas reserves in the North Sea, which accounts for 60 percent of all EU oil production. ) For the UK government, such political statements and moves mean the opening of yet another active separatist front with many unknowns. Despite such unusually tense relations, both London and the Scottish National Party intend to resolve their mutual disputes in a peaceful way.

Given the political implications of the «separatism syndrome» for Europe, European politicians seek to devise preventive mechanisms to counteract this phenomenon. The most effective of these include: — Devolution, i.e. transfer of some administrative decisions to the regional level (via regional parliaments, governments, fiscal bodies, police, etc. ); — The right to secession (the legal codification of this provision should reduce the secessionist attitudes among the politicians and citizens of the region, who will be aware of the political and economic consequences thereof); — Incorporation of authoritative regional politicians into the central authorities; — Active and effective state information policy.

Conclusions

With the foregoing in view, the following conclusions can be made. First, European separatism is not a one-dimensional phenomenon and includes economic as well as political, ethnic and national motives. The conscience of the economic man, which today is inherent in a modern commonplace European, seeks to maintain the same comfort and economic wellbeing, whatever the circumstances. This encourages them, on the one hand, to fight against the central authorities, and on the other hand, to support the political forces that promise to secure such comfort and wellbeing through secession and
independence. Second, European separatism varies from country to country: in the UK, it is categorical for long-term purposes and historically caused by the negative effects of colonization policies by the British in other provinces; in Spain, it is nationally and culturally specific, based on identity and history; and in Germany, it is «soft» in form and restrained in manifestation, with autonomy and federalization not destroying the state.

The analysis presented can be used by Ukraine’s public authorities, both national and local, as a reference to the state of separatism in EU member states, its current trends, and as a guide to respective policy-making in Ukrainian society.

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